Dr. Ambedkar’s Resignation Speech

Dr. Ambedkar’s Resignation Speech

Most of us know Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s ideological fights with Gandhi. Not many, however, would know the kind of issues he had with Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister. The modernist Pt. Nehru had turned so conservative after India’s freedom – or he was a conservative throughout his life that Dr. Ambedkar could no more remain his co-traveller and had to resign from his Cabinet on September 27, 1951. Reproduced [Ambedkar’s Writings, Vol. 14, Part Two, pages.1317-1327] is the full text of his speech on his resignation

Dr Ambedkar at a Constituent Assembly meeting.

Text of the Resignation

The House I am sure knows, unofficially if not officially, that I have ceased to be a member of the Cabinet.  I tendered my resignation on Thursday, the 27th September to the Prime Minister and asked him to relieve me immediately.  The Prime Minister was good enough to accept the same on the very next day.  If I have continued to be a Minister after Friday, the 28th, it is because the Prime Minister had requested me to continue till the end of the Session — a request to which I was, in obedience to constitutional convention, bound to assent.

Our Rules of Procedure permit a Minister who has resigned his office, to make a personal statement in explanation of his resignation.  Many members of Cabinet have resigned during my tenure of office.  There has been however no uniform practice in the matter of Ministers who have resigned making a statement.  Some have gone without making a statement  and others have gone after making a statement.  For a few days I was hesitant what course to follow.  After taking all circumstances into consideration I came to the conclusion that making of a statement was not merely necessary, but it was a duty which a member who has resigned owes to the House.

The House has no opportunity to know how the Cabinet works from within, whether there is harmony or whether there is a conflict, for the simple reason that there is a joint responsibility under which a member who is in a minority is not entitled to disclose his differences.  Consequently, the House continues to think that there is no conflict among members of Cabinet even when as a matter of fact a conflict exists.  It is, therefore, a duty of a retiring Minister to make a statement informing the House why he wants to go and why he is not able to continue to take further joint responsibility.

Secondly, if a Minister goes without making a statement, people may suspect that there is something wrong with the conduct  of the Minister, either in his public capacity or in his private capacity.  No Minister should, I think, leave room for such suspicion and the only safe way out is a statement.

Thirdly, we have our newspapers.  They have their age-old bias in favour of some and against others.  Their judgements are seldom based on merits.   Whenever they find an empty space, they are prone to fill the vacuum by supplying grounds for resignation which are not the real grounds but which put those whom they favour in a better light and those not in their favour in a bad light.  Some such thing I see has happened even in my case. It is for these reasons that I decided to make a statement before going out.

It is now 4 years, 1 month and 26 days since I was called by the Prime Minister to accept the office of Law Minister in his Cabinet.  The offer came as a great surprise to me.  I was in the opposite camp and had already been condemned as unworthy of association when the interim Government was formed in August 1946.  I was left to speculate as to what could have happened to bring about this change in the attitude of the Prime Minister.  I had my doubts.  I did not know how I could carry on with those who have never been my friends.  I had doubts as to whether I could, as a Law Member, maintain the standard of legal knowledge and acumen which had been maintained by those who had preceded me as Law Ministers of the Government of India.  But I kept my doubts at rest and accepted the offer of the Prime Minister on the ground that I should not deny my cooperation when it was asked for in the building up of our nation.  The quality of my performance as a Member of the Cabinet and as Law Minister, I must leave it to others to judge.

I will now refer to matters which have led me to sever my connection with my colleagues.  The urge to go has been growing from long past due to variety of reasons.

I will first refer to matters purely of a personal character and which are the least of the grounds which have led me to tender my resignation.  As a result of my being a Member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, I knew the Law Ministry to be administratively of no importance.  It gave no opportunity for shaping the policy of the Government of India.  We used to call it an empty soap box only good for old lawyers to play with.  When the Prime Minister made me the offer, I told him that besides being a lawyer by my education and experience, I was competent to run any administrative Department and that in the old Viceroy’s Executive Council, I held two administrative portfolios, that of Labour and C.P.W.D., where a great deal of planning projects were dealt with by me and would like to have some administrative portfolio.  The Prime Minister agreed and said he would give me in addition to Law the Planning Department which, he said, was intending to create.  Unfortunately the Planning Department came very late in the day and when it did come, I was left out.  During my time, there have been many transfers of portfolios from one Minister to another.  I thought I might be considered for any one of them.  But I have always been left out of consideration.  Many Ministers have been given two or three portfolios so that they have been overburdened.  Others like me have wanted more work.  I have not even been considered for holding a portfolio temporarily when a Minister in charge has gone abroad for a few days.  It is difficult to understand what the principle is underlying the distribution of Government work among Ministers which the Prime Minister follows.  Is it capacity?  Is it trust?  Is it friendship?  Is it pliability?  I was not even appointed to be a member of main Committees of the Cabinet such as Foreign Affairs Committee, or the Defence Committee.  When the Economics Affairs Committee was formed, I expected,   in view of the fact that I was primarily a student of Economics and Finance, to be appointed to this Committee.  But I was left out.  I was appointed to it by the Cabinet, when the Prime Minister had gone to England.  But when he returned, in one of his many essays in the reconstruction of the cabinet, he left me out.  In a subsequent reconstruction my name was added to the Committee, but that was as a result of my protest.

The Prime Minister, I am sure, will agree that I have never complained to him in this connection. I have never been a party to the game of power politics inside the cabinet or the game of snatching portfolios which goes on when there is a vacancy.  I believe in service, service in the post which the Prime Minister, who as the head of the Cabinet, thought fit to assign to me.  It would have, however, been quite unhuman for me not to have felt that a wrong was being done to me.

I will now refer to another matter that had made me dissatisfied with the Government.  It relates to the treatment accorded to the Backward Classes and the Scheduled Castes.  I was very sorry that the Constitution did not embody any safeguards for the Backward Classes.  It was left to be done by the Executive Government on the basis of the recommendations of a Commission to be appointed by the President.  More than a year has elapsed since we passed the Constitution.  But the Government has not even thought of appointing the Commission.  The year 1946 during which I was out of office, was a year of great anxiety to me, and to the leading members of the Scheduled Castes.  The British had realised from the commitments they had made in the matter of constitutional safeguards for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Castes had no knowing as to what the Constituent Assembly would do in that behalf.  In this period of anxiety, I had prepared a report* on the condition of the Scheduled Castes for submission to the United Nations.  But I did not submit it. I felt that it would be better to wait until the Constituent Assembly and the future Parliament was given a chance to deal with the matter.  The provisions made in the Constitution for safeguarding the position of the Scheduled Castes were not to my satisfaction.  However, I accepted them for what they were worth, hoping that Government will show some determination to make them effective.  What is the Scheduled Castes today?  So far as I see, it is the same as before.  The same old tyranny, the same old oppression, the same old discrimination which existed before, exists now and perhaps in a worst form.  I can refer to hundreds of cases where people from the Scheduled Casts round about Delhi and adjoining places have come to me with their tales of woes against the Caste Hindus and against the Police who have refused to register their complaints and render them any help. I have been wondering whether there is any other parallel in the world to the condition of Scheduled Castes in India.  I cannot find any.  And yet why is no relief granted to the Scheduled Castes?  Compare the concern the Government shows over safeguarding the Muslims.  The Prime Minister’s whole time and attention is devoted for the protection of the Muslims.  I yield to none, not even to the Prime Minister, in my desire to give the Muslims of India the utmost protection wherever and whenever they stand in need of it.  But what I want to know is, are the Muslims the only people who need protection?  Are the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and the Indian Christians not in need of protection?  What concern has he shown for these communities?  So far as I know, none and yet these are the communities which need far more care and attention than the Muslims.

I could not contain within myself the indignation I have felt over the neglect of the Scheduled Castes by the Government and on one occasion, I gave vent to my feelings at a public meeting of the Scheduled Castes.  A question was asked, from the Hon’ble the Home Minister, whether my charge that the Scheduled Castes had not benefited by the rule which guaranteed to them 12 ½ per cent representation was true.  In answer to the question the Hon’ble the Home Minister was pleased to say that my charge was baseless.  Subsequently for some reason – it may be for satisfying the qualms of his conscience – he, I am informed, sent round a circular to the various Departments of the Government of India asking them to report how many Scheduled Caste candidates had been recently recruited in Government service.  I am informed that most Departments in reply said “NIL’ or nearly nil.  If my information is correct, I need make no commentary on the answer given by the Hon’ble the Home Minister.

From my yearly childhood I have dedicated myself to the upliftment of the Scheduled Castes among whom I was born.  It is not that there were no temptations in my way.  If I had considered my own interest I could have been anything I wanted to be and if I had joined the Congress would have reached to the highest place in that organization.  But as I said, I had dedicated myself to the upliftment of Scheduled Castes and I have followed the adage that it is better to be narrow-minded if you wish to be enthusiastic about a cause which you wish to accomplish.  You can therefore, well imagine what pain it has caused me to see that the cause of the Scheduled Castes has been relegated to the limbo of nothing.

The third matter which has given me cause, not merely for dissatisfaction but for actual anxiety and even worry, is the foreign policy of the country.  Any one, who has followed the course of our foreign policy and along with it the attitude of other countries towards India, could not fail to realize the sudden change that has taken place in their attitude towards us.  On 15th of August, 1947 when we began our life as an independent country, there was no country which wished us ill. Every country in the world was our friend.  Today, after four years, all our friends have deserted us.  We have no friends left.  We have alienated ourselves.  We are pursuing a lonely furrow with no one even to second our resolutions in the U.N.O.  When I think of our foreign policy, I am reminded of what Bismarck and Bernard Shaw have said.  Bismark has said that “politics is not a game of realizing the ideal.  Politics is the game of the possible.”  Bernard Shaw not very long ago said that good ideals are good but one must not forget that it is often dangerous to be too good.  Our foreign policy is in complete opposition to these words of wisdom uttered by two of the world’s greatest men.

How dangerous it has been to us this policy of doing the impossible and of being too good is illustrated by the great drain on our resources made by our military expenditure, by the difficulty of getting food for our starving millions and by difficulty of getting aid for the industrialization of our country.

Out of 350 crores of rupees of revenue we raise annually, we spend about Rs180 crores of rupees on the Army.  It is a colossal expenditure which has hardly any parallel.  This colossal expenditure is the direct result of our foreign policy.  We have to foot the whole of our Bill for our defence ourselves because we have no friends on which we can depend for help in any emergency that may arise.  I have been wondering whether this is the right sort of foreign policy.

Our quarrel with Pakistan is a part of our foreign policy about which I feel deeply dissatisfied.  There are two grounds which have disturbed our relations with Pakistan – one is Kashmir and the other is the condition of our people in East Bengal.  I felt that we should be more deeply concerned with East Bengal where the condition of our people seems from all the newspapers intolerable than with Kashmir.  Notwithstanding this we have been staking out all on the Kashmir issue.  Even then I feel we have been fighting on an unreal issue.  The issue on which we have been fighting most of the time is, who is in the right and who is in the wrong.  The real issue to my mind is not who is right but what is right.  Taking that to be the main question, my view has always been that the right solution is to partition Kashmir.  Give the Hindu and Buddhist part to India and the Muslim part to Pakistan as we did in the case of India.  We are really not concerned with the Muslim part of Kashmir.  It is a matter between the Muslims of Kashmir and Pakistan.  They may decide the issue as they like.  Or if you like, divide into three parts; the Cease fire zone, the Valley and the Jammu-Ladhak Region and have a plebiscite only in the Valley.  What I am afraid of is that in the proposed plebiscite, which is to be an overall plebiscite, the Hindus and Buddhists of Kashmir are likely to be dragged into Pakistan against their wishes and we may have to face same problems as we are facing today in East Bengal.

I will now refer to the Fourth matter which has a good deal to do with my resignation.  The Cabinet has become a merely recording and registration office of decisions already arrived at by Committees.  As I have said, the Cabinet now works by Committees.  There is a Defence Committee.  There is a Foreign Committee.  All important matters relating to Defence are disposed of by the Defence Committee.  The same members of the Cabinet are appointed by them.  I am not a member of either of these Committees.  They work behind an iron curtain.  Others who are not members have only to take joint responsibility without any opportunity of taking part in the shaping of policy.  This is an impossible position.

I will now deal with a matter which has led me finally to come to the decision that I should resign.  It is the treatment which was accorded to the Hindu Code.  The Bill was introduced in this House on the 11th April, 1947.  After a life of four years, it was killed and died unwept and unsung, after 4 clauses of it were passed.  While it was before the House, it lived by fits and starts.  For full one year, the Government did not feel it necessary to refer it to a Select Committee.  It was referred to the Select Committee on 9th April 1948.  The Report was presented to the House on 12th August, 1948.  The motion for the consideration of the Report was made by me on 31st August 1948.  It was merely for making the motion that the Bill was kept on the Agenda.  The discussion of the motion was not allowed to take place until the February Session of the year 1949.  Even then it was not allowed to have a continuous discussion.  It was distributed over 10 months, 4 days in February, 1 day in March and 2 days in April 1949.  After this, one day was given to the Bill in December, 1949, namely the 19th December, on which day the House adopted my motion that the Bill as reported by the Select Committee be taken into consideration.  No time was given to the Bill in the year 1950.  Next time the Bill came before the House was on 5th February, 1951 when the clause by clause consideration of the Bill was taken.  Only three days 5th, 6th and 7th February were given to the Bill and left there to rot.

This being the last sessions of the present Parliament, Cabinet had to consider whether Hindu Code Bill should be got through before this Parliament ended or whether it should be left over to the new Parliament.  The Cabinet unanimously decided that it should be put through in this Parliament.  So the Bill was put on the Agenda and was taken up on the 17th September 1951 for further clause by clause consideration.  As the discussion was going on, the Prime Minister put forth a new proposal, namely, that the Bill as a whole may not be got through within the time available and that it was desirable to get a part of it enacted into law rather than allow the whole of it to go to waste.  It was a great wrentch to me.  But I agreed, for, as the proverb says “it is better to save a part when the whole is likely to be lost”.  The Prime Minister suggested that we should select the Marriage and Divorce part.  The Bill in its truncated form went on.  After two or three days of the discussion of the Bill the Prime Minister came up with another proposal.  This time his proposal was to drop the whole Bill even the Marriage and Divorce portion.  This came to me as a great shock – a bolt from the blue.  I was stunned and could not say anything.  I am not prepared to accept that the dropping of this truncated Bill was due to want of time.  I am sure that the truncated bill was dropped because other and more powerful members of the Cabinet wanted precedence for their Bills.  I am unable to understand how the Bananas and Aligarh University Bills, how the Press Bill could have been given precedence over the Hindu Code even in its attenuated form?  It is not that there was no law on the Statute Book to govern the Aligarh University or the Benares University.  It is not that these Universities would have gone to wreck and ruins if the Bills had not been passed in this Session.  It is not that the Press Bill was urgent.  There is already a law on the Statute Book and the Bill could have waited.  I got the impress that the Prime Minister, although sincere, had not the earnestness and determination required to get the Hindi Code Bill through.

In regard to this Bill, I have been made to go through the greatest mental torture.  The aid of Party Machinery was denied to me.  The Prime Minister gave freedom of Vote, an unusual thing in the history of the Party.  I did not mind it.  But I expected two things.  I expected a party whip as to time limit on speeches and instruction to the Chief whip to move closure when sufficient debate had taken place. A whip on time limit on speeches would have got the Bill through.  When freedom of voting was given there could have been no objection to have given a whip for time limit on speeches.  But such a whip was never issued.  The conduct of the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, who is also the Chief Whip of the Party in connection with the Hindu Code, to say the least, has been most extraordinary. He has been the deadliest opponent of the Code and has never been present to aid me by moving a closure motion.  For days and hours filibustering has gone on a single clause.  But the Chief Whip, whose duty it is to economise Government time and push on Government business, has been systematically absent when the Hindu Code has been under consideration in the House.  I have never seen a case of a Chief Whip so disloyal to the Prime Minister and a Prime Minister so loyal to a disloyal Whip.  Notwithstanding this unconstitutional behaviour, the Chief Whip is really a darling of the Prime Minister.  For notwithstanding his disloyalty he got a Promotion in the Party organization.  It is impossible to carry on in such circumstances.

It has been said that the Bill had to be dropped because the Opposition was strong.  How strong was the Opposition?  This Bill has been discussed several times in the Party and was carried to division by the opponents.  Every time the opponents were routed.  The last time when the Bill was taken up in the Party Meeting out of 120 only 20 were found to be against it.  When the Bill was taken in the Party for discussion, 44 clauses were passed in about 3 ½ hours’ time.  This shows how much opposition there was to the Bill within the Party.  In the House itself, there have been divisions on three clauses of the Bill – 2, 3 and 5.  Every time there has been an overwhelming majority in favour even on clause 4 which is the soul of the Hindu Code.

I was, therefore, quite unable to accept the Prime Minister’s decision to abandon the Bill on the ground of time.  I have been obliged to give this elaborate explanation for my resignation because some people have suggested that I am going because of my illness. I wish to repudiate any such suggestion.  I am the last man to abandon my duty because of illness.

It may be said that my resignation is out of time and that if I was dissatisfied with the Foreign Policy of the Government and the treatment accorded to Backward Classes and the Scheduled Castes I should have gone earlier.  The charge may sound as true.  But I had reasons which held me back.  In the first place, most of the time I have been a Member of the Cabinet; I have been busy with the framing of the Constitution. It absorbed all my attention till 26th January 1950 and thereafter I was concerned with the People’s Representation Bill and the Delimitation Orders.  I had hardly any time to attend to our Foreign Affairs.  I did not think it right to go away leaving this work unfinished.

In the second place, I thought it necessary to stay on, for the sake of the Hindu Code.  In the opinion of some, it may be wrong for me to have held on for the sake of the Hindu Code.  I took a different view.  The Hindu Code was the greatest social reform measure ever undertaken by the legislature in this country. No law passed by the Indian Legislature in the past or likely to be passed in the future can be compared to it in point of its significance.

To leave inequality between class and class, between sex and sex, which is the soul of Hindu Society untouched and to go on passing legislation relating to economic problems is to make a farce of our Constitution and to build a palace on a dung heap.  This is the significance I attached to the Hindu Code.  It is for its sake that I stayed on notwithstanding my differences.  So if I have committed a wrong, it is in the hope of doing some good.  Had I no ground for such a hope, for overcoming the obstructionist tactics of the opponents?  I would like in this connection to refer only to three of the statements made by the Prime Minister on the floor of the House.

On 28th November, 1949, the Prime Minister gave the following assurance.  He said:

“What is more, the Government is committed to this thing (Hindu Code).  It is going through with it.”

“Government would proceed with that.  It is for this House to accept a measure, but if a Government takes an important measure, and the House rejects it, the House rejects that Government and the Government goes and another Government comes in its place.  It should be clearly understood that this is one of the important measures to which the Government attaches importance and on which it will stand or fall.”

Again on 19th December, 1949, the Prime Minister said:

“I do not wish the House to think in the slightest degree that we consider that this Hindu Code Bill is not of importance, because we do attach the greatest important to it, as I said, not because of any particular clause or anything, but because of the basic approach to this vast problem in problems, economic and social.  We have achieved political freedom in this country, political independence.  That is a stage in the journey, and there are other stages, economic, social and other and if society is to advance, there must be this integrated advance on all fronts.”

On the 26th September, 1951, the Prime Minister said:

“It is not necessary for me to assure the House of the desire of Government to proceed with this measure in so far as we can proceed with it within possibilities, and so far as we are concerned we consider this matter as adjourned till such time as the next opportunity – I hope it will be in this Parliament – offers itself.”

This was after the Prime Minister had announced the dropping of the Bill.  Who could not have believed in these pronouncements of the Prime Minister?  If I did not think that there could be a difference between the promises and performances of the Prime Minister the fault is certainly not mine.  My exit from the Cabinet may not be a matter of much concern to anybody in this Country.  But I must be true to myself and that can be only by going out. Before I do so, I wish to thank my colleagues for the kindness and courtesy they have shown to me during my membership of the Cabinet.  While I am not resigning from my membership of Parliament, I also wish to express my gratitude to Members of Parliament for having shown great tolerance towards me.

10th October 1951

New Delhi                                                                                                                  B.R. Ambedkar

THE STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERATION

(a) The Federal Legislature

The Federal Legislature is a bicameral legislature. There is a Lower House which is spoken of as the Legislative Assembly and there is an Upper House which is called the Council of State. The composition of the two Chambers is a noteworthy feature. They are very small Chambers compared with other legislatures having regard to the population and the area as the total membership of the Federal Assembly is 375 and of the Council of State 260. These seats are divided in a certain proportion between British India and the Indian States. Of the 375 seats in the Federal Assembly 250 are allotted to British India and 125 to the Indian States. In the Council of State, out of the 260 seats, 156 are allotted to British India and 104 to the Indian States. It may be noticed that distribution between British India and the Indian States is not based upon an equalitarian principle. It is possible to take the population as the basis of representation. It is also possible to take the revenue as the basis of representation. But neither of these has been taken as the basis of distribution of seats. Whether you take population as the basis or whether you take revenue as the basis, you will find that British India has been under-represented, while the Indian States have been over-represented in the two Chambers. The method of filling the seats is also noteworthy. The representatives of the British India in both the Chambers will be elected. The representatives of the Indian States, on the other hand, are to be appointed i.e., nominated, by the Rulers of the States. It is open to a Ruler to provide that the representatives of his State, though appointed by him, may be chosen by his subjects but this is a matter which is left to his discretion. He may appoint a person who is chosen by his people or he may, if he pleases, do both, choose and appoint. In the final result a State's representative is to be appointed by the Ruler as distinguished from being elected by the people. In the case of British India, the representatives are to be elected, but here again there is a peculiarity which may be noticed. In the case of all bi-cameral Legislatures the Lower House being a popular house is always elected directly by the people, while the Upper House being a revising Chamber is elected by indirect election. In the case of the Indian Federation this process is reversed. The Upper Chamber will be elected by direct election by the people and it is the Lower Chamber which is going to be elected indirectly by the Provincial Legislatures. The life of the Federal Assembly is fixed for a term of five years, although it may be dissolved sooner. The Council of State on the other hand is a permanent body not liable to dissolution. It is a body which lives by renewal of a third part of its membership every three years.


Now the authority of the two Chambers to pass laws and to sanction expenditure may be noted. With regard to the authority to pass laws some constitutions make a distinction between money bills and other bills and provide that with regard to money bills the Upper Chamber shall not have the power to initiate such a bill, and also that the Upper Chamber shall not have the authority to reject it. It is given the power only to suspend the passing of the bill for a stated period. The Indian constitution makes no such distinction at all. The money bills and other bills are treated on the same footing and require the assent of both the Chambers before they can become law. The only distinction is that while according to section 30(7) a bill which is not a money bill may originate in either Chamber, a money bill, according to section 37, shall not originate in the Upper Chamber. But according to section 3(2) a money bill needs the assent of the Upper Chamber as much as any other bill.


With regard to the authority to sanction expenditure: here again there is a departure made in the accepted principles of distributing authority between the two Chambers when a Legislature is bi-cameral.


According to section 31(7) the Annual Financial Statement of estimated receipts and expenditure shall be laid before both Chambers of the Federal Legislature and shall, of course, be open to discussion in. both the Chambers. Not only are they open to discussion in both the Chambers, they are also subject to the vote of both the Chambers. Section 34(2) requires that the expenditure shall be submitted in the form of demands for grants to the Federal Assembly and thereafter to the Council of State and either Chamber shall have the power to assent to or refuse any demand, or to assent to any demand subject to a reduction of the amount specified therein.


It will thus be seen that the two Chambers are co-equal in authority, both in the matter of their authority to pass laws and in the matter of sanctioning expenditure. A conflict between the two Chambers cannot end by one Chamber yielding to the other if that Chamber does not wish so to yield. The procedure adopted for the resolving of differences between the two Chambers is the method of joint sessions. Section 31 (1) deals with the procedure with regard to joint sessions where the convict relates to a bill. Section 34(3) relates to the procedure where the conflict relates to the differences with regard to sanctioning of expenditure.


(b) The Federal Executive


The constitution of the Federal Executive is described in section 7(1). According to this section the executive Authority of the Federation is handed over to the Governor-General. It is he who is the Executive Authority for the Federation. The first thing to note about this Federal Executive is that it is a unitary executive and not a corporate body. In India ever since the British took up the civil and military government of the country, the executive has never been unitary in composition. The executive was a composite executive. ie the Provinces it was known as the Governor-in-Council. At the Centre it was known as the Governor-General-in-Council. The civil and military government of the Provinces as well as of India was not vested either in the Governor or in the Governor-General. The body in which it was vested was the Governor with his Councillors. The Councillors were appointed by the King and did not derive their authority from the Governor-General. They derived their authority from the Crown and possessed co-equal authority with the Governor and the Governor-General and, barring questions where the peace and tranquillity of the territory was concerned, the Governor and the Governor-General were bound by the decision of the majority. The constitution, therefore, makes a departure from the established system. I am not saying that this departure is unsound in principle or it is not justified by precedent or by the circumstances arising out of the necessities of a federal constitution. All I want you to note is that this is a very significant change.


The next thing to note about the Federal Executive is that although the Governor-General is the Executive Authority for the Federation, there are conditions laid down for the exercise of his powers as the Federal Executive. The constitution divides the matters falling within his executive authority into four classes and prescribes how he is to exercise his executive authority in respect of each of these four classes. In certain matters the Governor-General (1) is to act in his own discretion; (2) In certain matters he is to act on the advice of his Ministers; (3) in certain matters he is to act after consultation with his Ministers, arid (4) in certain matters he is to act according to his individual judgment. A word may be said as to the de jure connotation that underlies these four cases of the exercise of the executive authority by the Governor-General. The best way to begin to explain this de jure connotation is to begin by explaining what is meant by "acting on the advice of his ministers." This means, in those matters the government is really carried on, on the authority of the Ministers and only in the name of the Governor-General. To put the same thing differently, the advice of the Ministers is binding on the Governor-General and he cannot differ from their advice. With regard to the matters where the Governor-General is allowed, " to act in his discretion " what is meant is that the Government is not only carried on in the name of the Governor-General, but is also carried on the authority of the Governor-General. That means that there can be no intervention or interference by the Ministers at any stage. The Ministers have no right to tender any advice and the Governor-General is not bound to seek their advice; or to make it concrete, the files with regard to these matters need not go to the Ministers at all. "Acting in his individual judgment" means that while the matter is within the advisory jurisdiction of the Minister, the Minister has no final authority to decide. The final authority to decide is the Governor-General. The distinction between "in his discretion" and "in his individual judgment" is this that while in regard to matters falling "in his discretion" the Ministers have no right to tender advice to the Governor-General the Ministers have a right to tender advice when the matter is one which falls under " his individual judgment ". To put it differently in regard to matters which are subject to his individual judgment the Governor-General is bound to receive advice from his ministers but is not bound to follow their advice. He may consider their advice, but may act otherwise and differently from the advice given by the Ministers. But in respect of matters which are subject to his discretion he is not bound even to receive the advice of his Ministers. The phrase " after consultation " is a mere matter of procedure. The authority in such matter vests in the Governor-General. All that is required is that he should take into account the wishes of the Ministers. Cases relating to " acting after consultation " may be distinguished from cases relating to " individual judgment " in this way. In cases relating to " individual judgment" the authority vests in the Ministers. The Governor-General has the power to superintend and, if necessary, overrule. In the cases falling under " after consultation ", the authority belongs to the Governor-General and the Ministers have the liberty to say what they wish should be done.


(c) The Federal Judiciary


The Government of India Act provides for the constitution of a Federal Court as part of the Federal Constitution. The Federal Court is to consist of a Chief Justice and such Puisne Judges as His Majesty thinks necessary, their number not to exceed six until an address is presented by the Legislature asking for an increase. The Federal Judiciary has original as well as appellate jurisdiction. Section 204, which speaks of the Original Jurisdiction of the Federal Court, prescribes that, that Court shall have exclusive Original Jurisdiction in any dispute between the Federation, the Provinces and the federated States which involves any question of law or fact on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends. This section, however, provides that if a State is party then the dispute must concern the interpretation of the Act or an Order in Council thereunder, or the extent of the legislative or executive authority vested in the Federation by the Instrument of Accession or arise under an Agreement under Part VI of the Act for the administration of a federal law in the States, or otherwise concern some matter in which the Federal Legislature has power to legislate for the States or arise under an agreement made after federation with the approval of the Representative of the Crown between the States and the Federation or a Province, and includes provision for such jurisdiction. Even this limited jurisdiction of the Federal Court over the States is further limited by the proviso that no dispute is justifiable if it arises under an agreement expressly excluding such jurisdiction.


The appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Court is regulated by section 205 and section 207. Section 205 says that an appeal shall lie to the Federal Court from any judgment, decree or final order of a High Court in British India if the High Court certified that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Act or an Order in Council made thereunder. Section 207 relates to appeal from decision of Courts of the Federated States. It says that an appeal shall be to the Federal Court from a Court in a federated State on the ground that a question of law has been wrongly decided, being a question which concerns the interpretation of this Act or of any Order in Council made thereunder or the extent of the legislative or executive authority vested in the Federation by virtue of the Instrument of Accession of that State or arises under an Agreement made under Part VI of this Act in relation to the administration in that State of a law of the Federal Legislature ; but sub-section (2) to section 207 provides that an appeal under this section shall be by way of a special case to be stated for the opinion of the Federal Court by a High Court, and the Federal Court may require a case to be so stated.


Two further points with regard to the Federal Judiciary may be noted. The first is the power of the Federal Court to execute its own orders. The Federal Court has no machinery of its own to enforce its orders. Section 210 provides that the orders of the Federal Court shall be enforceable by all courts and authorities in every part of British India or of any Federated State as if they were orders duly made by the highest court exercising civil or criminal jurisdiction as the case may be in that part. The instrumentality, therefore, which the Federal Court can use for the enforcement of its own orders consists of the administrative machinery of the units of the Federation. The units of the Federation are bound to act in aid of the Federal Court. This is different to what prevails for instance, in the United States of America, where the Supreme Court has its own machinery for enforcing its own orders.


The second point to note with regard to the Federal Court is the question of the powers of the Executive to remove the judges and the power of the Legislature to discuss their conduct. In this respect also the Federal Court stands on a different footing from the Federal Courts in other Federations. The Constitution does not give the Governor-General the power to suspend a Judge of the Federal Court. It forbids any discussion of a judge's judicial conduct by the Legislature. This. no doubt, gives the judge of the Federal Court the greatest fixity of tenure and immunity from interference by the Executive or by the Legislature. To remove the Judiciary from the control of the Executive it has been found necessary that the tenure of a judge must not be subject to the pleasure of the Executive. All constitutions, therefore, provide that the tenure of a judge shall be during good behaviour and that a judge shall be removable only if address is presented by the Legislature pronouncing that he is not of good behaviour. Some such authority must be vested in somebody which should have the power to pronounce upon the good behaviour of a judge. This provision is absent in the Federal Constitution, so that a Judge of the Federal Court once appointed is irremovable from his place till retirement, no matter what his conduct during that period may be. Instead of this power is given to His Majesty under section 200(2)(b) to remove a Judge of the Federal Court on the ground of misbehaviour or infirmity of body or mind it the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council reports that he may be removed on any such ground.


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